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Abstract 
A review of statistics concerning fatal medical negligence in the NHS shows that, despite 
fears of a ‘compensation culture’ and the right to life protected by Human Rights 
legislation, only about one in every 1,000 such cases is investigated by the courts. This 
appears to be largely due to very poor reporting of adverse incidents by health 
authorities. However, as a result of recent healthcare scandals, the reporting of incidents 
is expected to significantly increase in the near future. The case of R v Southampton 
University Hospitals NHS Trust 2006 illustrates the striking effect that enhanced levels of 
scrutiny can have in these cases.  While there was nothing extraordinary in the facts of 
this case, and the hospital’s safety record did not appear to be any worse than average, 
the doctors involved were convicted of gross negligence manslaughter and the hospital 
was heavily fined under Health and Safety legislation for systemic failures. R v 
Southampton demonstrates that poor hospital systems are not immune from legal action 
in cases of fatal medical negligence, and recent developments suggest considerable 
potential liability for the NHS in this respect. 
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1 The Significance of R v Southampton University Hospitals NHS Trust 
At Winchester Crown Court in 2006, Judge Michael Broderick declared that the case 
before him had implications for the whole NHS,1 and it certainly looked that way. The 
case concerned the death of 31-year-old Sean Phillips from infection shortly after a 
routine tendon operation in a hospital run by Southampton University Hospitals NHS 
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 BBC News, ‘Trust guilty over death doctors,’ 11/1/2006, 
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Trust. The two junior doctors responsible for Mr. Phillips’ poor aftercare had been 
convicted of gross negligence manslaughter.2 Over a weekend shift, they had missed 
the diagnostic signs, failed to seek advice, chase up results or administer antibiotics, and 
this had resulted in Mr. Phillips’ untimely death. The finding of gross negligence 
manslaughter had been dramatic, since the failures in care had arguably fallen short of 
the gross negligence in Adomako,3 and not that far beyond the inept, but non-criminal, 
medical negligence of Prentice and Sullman.4 
 
However, the remarkable feature of the case was that the Trust then found itself in the 
dock for failing to properly supervise the doctors at the time. This was quite unlike any 
other cases of fatal medical negligence.5 A civil compensation claim under the Fatal 
Accidents Act 1976 is the norm, and, in a few exceptionally serious cases, the staff 
involved might face professional sanctions or criminal charges.6 Here, poor hospital 
systems, generally regarded as the root cause of most medical errors7 but usually 
beyond legal action,8 were also being held to account. The Trust pleaded guilty to one of 
the five charges brought against it under s.3 Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 
(HSAW), on the basis that the other four charges would be dropped and that the 
admitted failing had not actually caused Mr. Phillips’ death. In this way, the Trust hoped 
to avoid liability under common law corporate manslaughter that might have otherwise 
applied at that time. In spite of the plea bargain, the hospital was fined an 
unprecedented £100,000, and this attracted considerable adverse publicity and 
comment.9 
 
So, R v Southampton10 looked set to make aspects of ‘system failure’ in the NHS 
actionable, opening the door to the possibility of corporate manslaughter.11 Certainly, the 
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judgment implied that hospitals would now find it much harder to escape liability for poor 
care by letting individual (often junior) staff take all the blame, and this was widely 
regarded as an important step forward in forcing better learning from adverse incidents 
in the NHS.12 Subsequently, both the gross negligence manslaughter by the doctors and 
the ‘almost’ corporate manslaughter by the Trust were appealed,13 with limited success, 
adding further to the judicial significance of the cases. 
 
Despite a large number of similar deaths in the NHS each year,14 frequent poor 
healthcare scandals,15 significant financial problems for the NHS from civil litigation,16 
and an apparently positive legal way forward provided by R v Southampton, why have 
so few similar actions been brought since? 
 
2 How Many Fatal Medical Negligence Cases Make it to Court? 
 
The National Audit Office estimates that there are up to 34,000 deaths a year in the NHS 
due to medical error.17 This is consistent with the results of most medical case note 
review studies,18 and constitutes the third most likely cause of death in the UK after heart 
disease and cancer. This information came as a surprise to the Commons Health Select 
Committee19 when the Mid-Staffordshire scandal broke in 2008. It became apparent 
during the Committee’s inquiries that on average only 5 to 10% of medical accidents 
were being reported even within the NHS,20 and that the more serious the incident, the 
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less likely it was to be reported at all.21 As if to reinforce the point, it emerged that 
questions of poor care at Mid-Staffordshire had not arisen from within the NHS itself 
(which regarded Mid-Staffordshire as exemplary at the time22), but because quasi-
independent researchers at Imperial College23 noticed the high mortality rates and 
informed the Healthcare Commission,24 who then took the opportunity to cause a fuss 
immediately before being disbanded by the Secretary of State for Health. While excess 
mortality at Mid-Staffordshire may or may not prove to be an isolated problem, it is clear 
that poor reporting reflected much wider and longer-term problems in the NHS, in 
particular the push for independence from Strategic Health Authorities25 that had 
historically provided some on-the-spot regulation.26 
 
In the absence of adequate reporting and detailed analysis, the extent to which death 
due to medical error is equivalent to medically negligent death is not entirely clear. By 
definition though, each death by medical error identified in medical case note review 
studies involves a duty of care, and Bolam27 type breach and causation - that is breach 
and causation judged by the standards of other doctors. Since this is the test used in 
court, 34,000 deaths a year may not be an unreasonable estimate. It is sometimes 
argued, however, that the review studies approach may overestimate the true extent of 
medically negligent death,28 since medical causation is rarely straightforward. The 
classic complication scenario in Wilsher v Essex AHA29 is often cited in this respect.  The 
case involved five independent possible causes of the same blindness in a patient, only 
one of which involved a breach of duty, and this resulted in the claimant being unable to 
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demonstrate, on the balance of probabilities, that the defendant Health Authority had 
caused the damage. On the other hand, the National Audit Office point out that a further 
25,000 deaths a year are caused by thromboembolisms,30 many of which are the 
avoidable results of other earlier healthcare interventions, so the true extent of the 
problem may be even larger. 
 
No matter what the precise mortality figure is, there is certainly an extremely large 
disparity between rates of medical negligence and the number of cases that are litigated 
or compensated. The NHS Litigation Authority (NHSLA) indemnifies Trusts against 
negligence claims,31 and despite widespread fear of a compensation culture,32 the 
NHSLA deals with little more than 6,000 claims per year in total.33 This is a very low 
number compared to the 850,000 medical errors that the NHS itself estimates occur 
each year.34  In 2008, just 743 of NHSLA claims involved the death of a patient,35 and in 
at least some, the death itself was incidental to the claim. Of all claims received by the 
NHSLA in 2008, 48% were abandoned during the claims process and 49% were settled 
out of court by Part 36 Offers,36 leaving something like 200 medical negligence cases to 
be heard in court each year. This estimate is likely to be approximately correct, since it is 
similar to the total number of clinical negligence cases heard at the Queen’s Bench each 
year.37 On the basis of the NHSLA statistics above, about 10% of these cases involve a 
fatality. 
 
As was made clear by Takoushi,s38 under Article 2 European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR), the state has an obligation to provide a practical and effective judicial 
system for the determination of civil liability and for the investigation of the facts of a 
death in which medical negligence may have been involved. This is sometimes referred 
                                            
30
 A Safer Place for Patients: Learning to improve patient safety. 
31
 Including relatively low value compensation claims that might fall within the NHS Redress Act 
2006. 
32
 For example, see ss 1 and 2 Compensation Act 2006. 
33
 NHSLA, Factsheet 3: Information on Claims, available at http://www.npsa.com 
34
 National Patient Safety Agency, Reporting and Learning System, Quarterly Data Summary, 
November 2008. 
35
 Response to Freedom of Information request to the NHSLA, dated 29/9/2009. 
36
 National Patient Safety Agency, Reporting and Learning System, Quarterly Data Summary, 
adjusted to remove unsettled claims. Part 36 offers are compensation offers made under the Civil 
Procedure Rules 1988. 
37
 Ministry of Justice, Judicial and Court Statistics 2008. 
38
 R (ex parte Takoushis) v HM Coroner for Inner North London [2005] EWCA Civ 1440. 
 86 
to as the procedural obligation of Article 2. Internal investigations by the authorities 
involved in the death are not held to be sufficient (see JL39). In Takoushis, the Court of 
Appeal held that Article 2 is discharged under English law by a combination of a 
Coroner’s Inquest and civil action, and that no additional judicial inquiries are required.  
Inquests might therefore be expected to fulfil an important function in the investigation of 
medically negligent deaths.40 It appears, however, that the number of enhanced ‘Article 2 
engaged’ inquests is very low, with Coroners’ investigations for the most part restricted 
to the narrow Jamieson41 inquiry (a literal how the deceased came by their death) and by 
rules 36 and 42 of the Coroners Rules 1984 (a duty to avoid issues of civil liability).  
Statistics concerning inquests in relation to the NHS are difficult to find, but the Ministry 
of Justice estimates that about 460 a year42 involve medical defence organisations, 
which provide legal representation for medical staff where questions of liability are likely 
to be raised. Another indication that the number may be very low comes from the 
Coroners (Amendments) Rules 2008, which now allow Coroners to produce Rule 43 
Reports to prevent future deaths. In their first year of operation, just 58 reports were 
issued in relation to hospital deaths.43 
 
In spite of the procedural obligation then, the figures suggest that only about 1 in every 
1,000 medically negligent deaths is currently investigated in the courts. The apparently 
small number of relevant inquests implies that this may be largely due to poor reporting 
of medical error by the NHS, even to the Coroner’s Office. Other factors are also likely to 
be important in keeping legal action to a minimum. For example, it may be that the high 
rate of abandoned NHSLA claims is caused by the obvious difficulty in bringing a claim 
where the burden is entirely on the claimant to demonstrate that medical negligence has 
occurred, usually without access to either the expertise or the information that are 
available to the defendant hospital. Where causation is clear-cut, Part 36 Offers made by 
the NHSLA also have the effect of keeping a case out of the courts. This is because the 
Civil Procedure Rules mean that bereaved families risk liability for costs if an appropriate 
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offer is made and not accepted.44 The Human Rights cases of Powell45 and Calvelli46 
show that once these sorts of offers have been made, the courts will regard the matter 
as settled. 
 
So, only about 20 cases of fatal medical negligence will make it into the courts each 
year. Given this low number, it is perhaps not surprising that there are few criminal 
indictments of professionals for poor care, since the standard of proof required for gross 
negligence is so much greater than that required for civil negligence. There are obviously 
also fairly strong policy considerations involved in attempting to regulate public 
authorities by the criminal prosecution of individuals,47 all of whom are already 
theoretically regulated by bodies with statutory powers such as the General Medical 
Council.  As far as HSAW convictions for patient deaths in hospital trusts are concerned, 
there have been just seven since 1999,48 almost half of which involved falls from 
unsecured windows. 
 
3 What Made R v Southampton so Unusual?  
 
In terms of medical negligence, there was nothing particularly extraordinary in the facts 
of Misra and Srivastava,49 the two junior doctors involved in Mr. Phillips’ death. The 
death occurred on the Tuesday, and the doctors had worked the alternate shifts on the 
weekend immediately preceding it. During these shifts, both had failed to diagnose and 
therefore treat serious infection, although each had reviewed the patient on a number of 
occasions. There was no evidence of infection in the operation scar (even at post 
mortem), and there was evidence to suggest that Mr. Phillips’ problems may have been 
secondary to a minor gastro-intestinal infection,50 for which he was receiving some 
treatment and being observed.  He remained alert and aware for the whole weekend. 
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At trial, however, the expert medical opinions felt that the doctors should have diagnosed 
the more serious infection, and agreed that by sometime on the Sunday afternoon Mr. 
Phillips’ septicaemia would have been too well developed to respond to antibiotics. It 
seems to have been the blood sample taken by a third doctor on the Saturday evening 
that tipped the balance from possible medical negligence into gross negligence 
manslaughter. The fact that this blood sample was taken demonstrated that Mr. Phillips’ 
symptoms suggested more serious problems, and the results indicated that a more 
serious infection was indeed involved. However, no one had accessed the results until 
Sunday night, by which time (in retrospect) it was too late. 
 
The offence of gross negligence manslaughter requires that there is a breach of duty 
that exposes the victim to risk of death, that this breach causes the victim’s death, and 
crucially that the breach is so grossly negligent that it is consequentially a crime.51 This is 
the gross negligence test based on Bateman52 that was approved by the House of Lords 
in Adomako.53 In this situation, the necessary mens rea is provided by virtue of the 
negligence being gross, and questions of recklessness do not arise. Hence, in 
considering conviction, the jury at Winchester Crown Court were deciding whether failing 
to diagnose the infection fell so far short of acceptable medical standards that it 
constituted a serious criminal offence. While those acceptable standards were 
determined with reference to the expert medical opinions, it was the jury who found the 
doctors guilty. In this sense, the gross negligence test may sometimes set a lower hurdle 
than even normal Bolam54 negligence. 
 
Misra and Srivastava’s appeal55 followed in October 2004. They claimed that they had 
been acting in good faith at the time, and hence should not be guilty of a crime. They 
claimed that fresh expert evidence introduced new doubt into the issue of causation.  
The main contention, however, was that the offence itself, determined as it was by the 
jury, was sufficiently uncertain to contravene ECHR Articles 6 and 7.56 Ultimately, the 
Court of Appeal dismissed each argument, upholding the convictions and suggesting 
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that the offence laid out in Adomako, while containing a well-known element of 
circularity,57 did not conflict with the ECHR and should be regarded as clear enough. 
 
Having so conclusively and completely laid responsibility for Mr. Phillips’ death at the 
feet of the two junior doctors, it might seem surprising that by November 2005, the Trust 
was in Winchester Crown Court again for having failed in its duty of care to Mr. Phillips, 
this time under s.3 HSAW. After all, if unsafe systems at the hospital were also partly 
responsible for Mr. Phillips’ death, then the junior doctors’ individual culpability may have 
been over-estimated. 
 
Section 3 of the 1974 Act imposes a duty on institutions to take all reasonable practical 
steps to ensure that visitors, in this case patients, are not exposed to risks to their health 
and safety, and s.33(1) makes it an offence where there is a breach of s.3. The initial 
allegations against the Trust included general problems (for example, failing to organise 
ward rounds and hand-over meetings, and poor systems for reporting concerns to 
consultants), as well as failings more specifically related to the incident, such as failing to 
take up a reference for Dr. Misra.58 Of these, only failing to properly supervise the junior 
doctors was actually charged - as mentioned earlier, on the basis that it had not actually 
caused Mr. Phillips’ death. It became apparent that there had been concerns about the 
unit prior to the incident, including reporting and supervision issues, and a problem with 
Dr. Misra’s treatment of another patient that was brought to the attention of a senior 
consultant just the day before the death.59 The consultants running the unit also admitted 
that they had virtually no contact with the junior staff, depending on registrars to flag up 
any problems, and that some priorities and guidelines had been neglected given the 
pressures on the unit. Although these are to some extent problems facing most units in 
most hospitals, it was quite clear that grounds for the action existed. 
 
In bringing the action when they did, the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) may have 
felt that the manslaughter convictions would add some extra weight to their case against 
the Trust, but these were in no way a prerequisite. Damage is not required to make a 
breach of s.3 actionable, simply exposing the public to a risk by failing to take 
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reasonable practical steps to mitigate it is sufficient, provided that there can be said to 
have been fair notice.60 In R v Board of Trustees of the Science Museum,61 the Court of 
Appeal made it clear that any such risk where reasonable steps had not been taken 
would be considered a breach of s.3, regardless of the scale. The position vis-à-vis the 
risk may have narrowed recently, when the situation was again spelled out in R v 
Chargot.62 Here the issue of whether an injury might demonstrate a failing in health and 
safety arose. The House of Lords held that it did not; the key point was showing that a 
breach of duty had occurred, whether or not injury had resulted. This might, however, 
mean that the prosecution would now have to be fairly specific about the details of a 
breach in the absence of injury,63 but in the context of R v Southampton, whether the 
doctors were convicted of gross negligence manslaughter or simply of medical 
negligence would have made no legal difference to the Trust’s breach of s.3. The HSE 
therefore could have brought the action at any stage. 
 
Although at appeal,64 one of the Trust’s contentions was that Broderick J had ignored the 
basis of the guilty plea (that the breach had not resulted in the death), the appeal court 
maintained that the breach had been ‘very serious,’ and pointedly only dealt with the 
issue of the size of the fine imposed. The various mitigating and aggravating factors from 
R v F Howe and Son65 were discussed, with the guilty plea, early remedial action and the 
Trust’s apparently good safety record being held up in defence. The fine for a HSAW 
breach is designed to be a punitive measure (and can now be unlimited66), but the Trust 
argued that £100,000 was disproportionate for the NHS, where this money would have 
to be found from budgets providing healthcare. Hence, as a public authority, R v Milford 
Haven Port Authority67 was applied and the court reduced the fine to £40,000 plus costs. 
 
Given that the HSE action followed on from the negligence action, perhaps the most 
important element of R v Southampton is that it demonstrates how much information 
regarding the circumstances of Mr. Phillips’ death probably came to light as a result of 
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the gross negligence manslaughter investigations.68 It seems that there was nothing 
intrinsically unusual in the facts of the case. The death was one of a large number that 
happen every year. The junior doctors may have been negligent in their treatment, but 
arguably not much more grossly than in many other cases. The unit where they worked 
was over-stretched and less well organised than some, but not apparently unsafe 
compared to the average. What made R v Southampton unusual was the scrutiny it 
received. This may have been more to do with incidental features of the case than the 
determination of the various authorities involved. For example, it is an uncomfortable 
feature of Misra and Srivastava that by a majority, the Winchester jury convicted two 
junior doctors from a different ethnic background for the negligent death of a healthy, 
white, local, 31-year-old new father. 
 
4 Developments Since R v Southampton 
 
The scarcity of cases like R v Southampton in an area where there are clearly major 
problems, illustrates the mountain the NHS has to climb to achieve the sort of efficient 
learning from adverse incidents set out in policies like ‘Being Open.’69 If some element of 
scandal is required to bring out the necessary details from which to learn lessons, then 
there is no shortage on the horizon. The German out-of-hours locum Dr. Ubani,70 the 
Mid-Staffordshire inquiries71 and the problems at Basildon and Thurrock University 
Hospitals NHS Foundation Trust72 to name a few. 
 
The recent cases of Bailey73 and Canning-Kishver74 suggest that there may also have 
been some potentially very significant developments in the area of material contribution, 
simplifying to some extent the complex causation issues that are a feature of medical 
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negligence actions.75 The Corporate Manslaughter Act 2007 is also now in force, and 
this was expressly designed to overcome some of the problems that exist in making 
organisations liable for negligent deaths.76 
 
However, it may be the development of a ‘duty of candour’ for the NHS that will have the 
most far-reaching effect. Draft regulations now before Parliament77 will oblige all 
healthcare providers to report adverse incidents to the National Patient Safety Agency 
from April 2010. While this falls somewhat short of what campaigners had hoped to 
achieve (a duty of candour in addition to patients or their relatives78), it is likely to 
significantly increase the number of cases that receive some legal attention. At least 
some of these cases will involve a similar R v Southampton domino effect, and we can 
expect to see failing healthcare systems in the dock much more often in the near future.  
Indeed, the HSE has very recently charged two new breaches of s.3 in connection with 
deaths in hospitals; those of Kyle Flak at Basildon and Thurrock79 and Mayra Cabrera at 
the Great Western Hospital.80 
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